



THE PROBLEM OF THE CONSTITUTION OF CULTURE IN THE THOUGHT OF KAROL WOJTYŁA/ JOHN PAUL II

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Resumen: Este artículo considera el problema de la idea de la cultura humana tal como se desarrolla en el pensamiento de Karol Wojtyła. Procede a través de los problemas de la ‘experiencia’ y de lo ‘humanum’. Al considerar la constitución de nuestras ideas de una manera relevante para la constitución de la cultura en el mundo, Wojtyła se basa en las filosofías de la conciencia y las filosofías del ser con el fin de situar estas dos formas de constitución, en su dependencia óntica y praxeológica, de la persona humana. Además, el artículo pretende servir como una introducción a los aspectos menos investigados de la filosofía de Karol Wojtyła y nos anima a considerar si el método wojtyliano de investigación y análisis podría dar lugar a una escuela de filosofía.

Descriptores: Constitución de la cultura · Cultura · Experiencia · *Humanum* · Óntico-causal · Persona · Praxeológico · Praxis · Principios · Transitivo · Intransitivo · Trascendencia

Abstract: This article considers the problem of the idea of human culture as it develops in the thought of Karol Wojtyła. It proceeds through the problems of “experience” and the “*humanum*”. In order to consider the constitution of our ideas in a manner relevant to the constitution of culture in the world, Wojtyła draws on the philosophies of consciousness and the philosophies of being to place these two forms of constitution in their ontic and praxeological dependency on the human person. In addition, the article seeks to serve as an introduction to less investigated aspects of the philosophy of Karol Wojtyła and encourages us to consider whether the Wojtylian method of investigation and analysis could give rise to a school of philosophy.

KeyTerms: Constitution of Culture · Culture · Experience · *Humanum* · Ontic-causal · Person · Praxeological · *Praxis* · Principles · Transitive · Intransitive · Transcendence

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1. KEY WORKS AND TERMS

The key article in which Karol Wojtyła addresses the constitution of culture began as the opening lecture of a conference in Milan in March of 1977: Wojtyła (1977), p. 263. It may be viewed as a culmination of his philosophical themes prior to becoming pope (Buttiglione, 1997, p. 293). Wojtyła himself classifies it as a

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presentation of the main themes of his own philosophy in abbreviated form. He asks his listeners to consider those remarks in the context of his overall philosophy and to consider them in the context of two recent papers. The first was on the personal structure of self-determination while the second was on the relationship between theory and “praxis”. (Wojtyła, 1974; Wojtyła, 1976, TaP).

What does Wojtyła mean by “constitution of culture”? In “The Acting Person” and related articles,² he uses “constitution” to refer to the constitution of something in consciousness. He does this in keeping with its use in the philosophies of consciousness and phenomenology (Wojtyła, 1969 AP). We could say that in that sense it has to do more with the subjective processes of the person. In another context we see: “The human being is constituted metaphysically as a being by the *suppositum*” (Wojtyła, 1976). The latter is clearly a different use of the word “constituted” than what is used when referring to the constitution of consciousness or constitution in consciousness. Constitution of the human being by the *suppositum* is formal. It is metaphysical. Such constituting does not refer to dynamisms in consciousness except secondarily. In another context, “constitution” has a kind of reciprocal, dynamic nature related to objective and subjective dimensions of self-determination: “(...) on the basis of this *suppositum*, the human self gradually both discloses itself and constitutes itself –and it discloses itself also by constituting itself.” (Wojtyła, 1969 AP, p. 225).

The question arises what does he refer to when he suggests “constituting human culture through human *praxis*”? Is he talking about the constitution of the idea of culture in an individual person as in the case of their own subjective processes or is he talking about the constitution of the thing itself – human culture? What do these have to do with the constitution of the self or the formal constitution of the human being by the *suppositum*, the human person? I think we can say he is speaking of all of these in a way that exhibits an important interplay. That interplay is not accidental. It is not the result of the replacing of substantial claims with an elusive rhetoric. The interplay aims at unlocking the potential for some resolution to the enduring *aporia* in contemporary philosophy and currents of thought with regards to the constitution of something as idea and thing.³

I could consider constituting a city *with* something, or *through* something. Wojtyła chooses *through*. I can constitute a city with bricks or wood or marble or a combination of these. I can build a city with a number of products. I cannot

² For example, Wojtyła (1978), pp. 107-114.

³ I do not intend to suggest a discussion regarding the debate on ideal and real things in this article though, knowledge of this debate and occasional reference to it can be found in Wojtyła. I mean instead to reference the struggle regarding the unity of interpretation of the meaning of human experience between the philosophies of consciousness and the philosophies of being. This is the context in which Wojtyła places the problem of the idea of human culture.



constitute a city *through* bricks or wood or marble. However, I can constitute a city *through* a number of means. I can steal, I can conquest or I can employ human labor. Through human labor I can build a city. Similarly, Wojtyła's use of *through* indicates not the products in use but the means, persons and actions involved in constituting a culture. The constitution of the proper idea of culture takes place through the analysis of the human person in action. We see an existential relationship between the idea of culture and the constitution of culture on the basis of our ideas. This is the locus of the problem and its proposed resolution by Wojtyła namely, the problem of the subject's experience of culture and the proper constitution of culture as idea and thing. By virtue of the reconciliation of the objective meaning of human experience in the subject's experience which he argues more extensively in several earlier essays and his major work, such a proposal is conceivable. See Wojtyła (1969); (1974); (1969 AP).

For reasons particular to the article on the constitution of culture and as a means to bring together various considerations on human action, Wojtyła has us consider human action under the term *praxis*. What relationship does the word *praxis* have to the constitution of human culture? *Praxis* captures his philosophy of the analysis of human action which makes use of the dual traditions of the philosophy of potency and act and the philosophies of consciousness; in the context of important current events. *Praxis* as a term is the means to arrive at our insights. It is the manner in which Wojtyła can consider both the subjective and objective aspects of the meaning of human experience. In *praxis* he combines the Aristotelian understanding of "act of man" with a more modern use of *praxis* as "work of man", works of a specifically external nature. This permits him to unveil the simultaneous revelation of the objectivity and the subjectivity of the person in the unique category of experience found in the experience of self as acting agent. With this in mind we should understand his reference to the "experience of man" as that which reveals man as both the subject and object of action simultaneously.

Just before his election as Pontiff, Wojtyła is an influential bishop in communist Poland and an internationally renowned scholar. He argues against atheistic, materialistic Marxism as the proper interpretation of *praxis* in relation to human society and culture. He brings to our attention that the "forgetfulness of the *suppositum*" within the philosophies of consciousness with which he took issue in *The Acting Person* is also present in the forgetfulness of the *subjectum* in the *praxis* of Marxism (Colletti, 1980). Arguably, this forgetfulness is also present in certain theories regarding capitalism which prefer the accumulation of capital and material goods at the expense of spiritual goods and often at the expense of the solidarity of the members of society. Richard John Neuhaus (2000) reminds us that as Pope his criticism of the "defective machinery" in capitalism which leaves some

destitute while others have excess was not well received in some western countries. Both theories of *praxis* err in a similar priority of the material over the spiritual. Wojtyła argues that neither the collective organization of labor nor the accumulation of capital is the subject of an economic system. The subject of any economic system must always be man, the human person. Later, he will argue this in a series of encyclicals on work and the social order (John Paul II, 1981; 1987 SRS; 1991). In the case of both errant ideologies the analysis of human action involves replacing the metaphysical aspect of the *humanum* with something which fails to adequately account for the transcendence of the person in action. In the case of Marxism, the metaphysical is replaced with the social. In the case of capitalist materialism, the metaphysical is replaced with any number of transient ends or combination of transient ends. In consumerism, the metaphysical and transcendent are, for the most part, simply ignored as irrelevant.⁴ Aside from the specific historical circumstances we see broader philosophical implications unfolding the role of *praxis*.

For Wojtyła, *praxis* which is often used to refer to “work” as a species of human action still refers to *actus humanus* as the genus category, by that I mean it is first and foremost a spiritual activity of a person and the spiritual activity of the person acts as a co-extensive experience of the spiritual nature of the person even if this experience is not so much demonstrable through abstract reasoning as it is inducible through that experience. Far from intending a circular demonstration of the spiritual soul of man, Wojtyła invites us to consider the universality of the experience of the person as spiritual and *experienceable* in spiritual activity; a fact which if true is no more obvious by its co-extensive nature as an aspect of our essence than is knowledge of the inner workings of our organs and body prior to studying them. Any analysis of the processes of consciousness must always entail these pre-considerations. It is through the analysis of the person in action that we may come to a more complete understanding of the subject the human person in both its objective and subjective dimensions. This implies an epistemological stance on the part of Wojtyła which is relevant yet provocative to much of contemporary philosophy. That epistemological stance entails the conviction that human action, in its various manifestations and dimensions are interrelated and serves as a means

⁴ Wojtyła (1977), p. 267, says: “we must radically reassess all formulations that speak of the transformation or modification of the world as the sole purpose of human praxis. More importantly, we must reassess all programs that view the whole of activity between the poles of production and consumption. While not denying the fundamentality of these categories as poles of economic thought, and even their great usefulness given appropriate assumptions, we must be careful in this way of thinking and speaking not to allow the human being to become an epiphenomenon and, in a sense, a product. If culture is to be constituted through human praxis, we cannot agree to such an epiphenomenal, economic, or productionistic view of the human being and human action. We must ensure in this thought the priority of the human being both in the metaphysical and in the praxiological sense. Only with a strictly defined way of understanding human praxis can we speak of the constitution of culture through it.”



by which to reconsider the topic of *praxis* and culture. Human action possesses an intrinsic window to objectivity on the basis of the objectivity of the person acting (Wojtyła, 1977, p. 266).

Praxis must be understood axiologically as being rooted in the metaphysical subject, the *suppositum*, the human person; and *praxeologically* must be taken as reducible to the human being as actor. It is through *praxis* that the human being realizes itself, creates itself, and fulfills itself. While it is true that the human person needs and makes use of material causes for human perfection and fulfillment, it is also true that such a condition is itself not the reason, meaning or purpose of human action. It is on the basis of this understanding of *praxis* that Wojtyła wishes us to consider culture as a connatural reality in relation to the human being. It is in this sense that he can speak of the person as the ontic-cause of human culture as well as the subject and object of human culture, that is the subject engaging in action and the object of the action in the self-fulfillment of the one (and collectively of those) acting (Wojtyła, 1977, pp. 265-267).

We can also speak of *praxis* as possessing a two-fold dimension as human action and as experience '*przeżycie*'⁵ (Wojtyła, 1960, p. 302) with the latter having a reciprocal relationship to the former in the constitution of the person and human culture conceptually and actually. What I mean is that we cannot act except that we also have the experience that we are the one acting. We have the experience of being a 'creator' of culture and the experience of being a 'participator' in culture. I can create culture or contribute to it but I can also be formed and molded by it. These experiences in which I experience myself as the agent and a participator are universal experiences of the human person. The experience of the self in these experiences is universal.

2. PRINCIPLES IN THE CONSTITUTION OF CULTURE

In the constitution of culture I use the term "principles" to describe the several components of this constitution. Undoubtedly one could engage in an analysis of the various nuances of the meaning of 'principle' in works of Wojtyła and while I think this would be a valuable exercise I prefer, for the most part, to leave that task to other works. This term is accurate enough to describe several

⁵ *przeżycie* - Consulting with the Polish director of the Casa Dom Polski Archives of John Paul II in Rome we find that this Polish word has something of the German "Erlebnis" to it while also something of the English "endured". With regard to the categories of Aristotle it is the word for experience in Polish most useful to express an experience in which there takes place a transition from potency to act. Ignatik, in his new translation of Love and Responsibility p.302, agrees and offers more. "Experience" in Wojtyła has a much richer and revealing meaning with regard to the structure of the human person than either the tradition of Aristotelian/Thomistic philosophy. For Wojtyła, it also extends beyond that of its use in phenomenology and expresses a broader meaning of experience and a human person's capacity for apprehension including such underlying derivatives (in Polish) as "knowledge", "witness" and "news". When referring to experience broadly Wojtyła uses *doświadczenie*.

components of the constitution of culture both as idea and thing in Wojtyła, while leaving room for more specific developments and the naming of other components later. ‘Principles’ also contributes to my aim to speak of a ‘scaffolding of Wojtylian analysis’ or ‘school of Wojtylian analysis’. This claim arises as the result of my own research and comprehension together with the confirming perspective of other authors especially, Seifert (1981), Burgos (2014), p. 87ff., and Guerra (2002). In order to develop specific applications we need to develop a means which is at one and the same time faithful to that Wojtylian scaffolding and school while still being a unique work. ‘Principle’ lends itself very well to such a development.

This term was used by John Paul II on his famous visit to Chile during which he arguable saved Chile⁶ from the great tragedy of civil war (cf. John Paul, 1987); Cavada (1997) p. 214. That visit highlighted his method and theories on the problem of the idea of culture in such a way that he became a co-contributor to the constitution of Chilean culture in a specific time of crises. He played a similar role in his own country of Poland shortly after becoming pontiff. There he helped to architect the solidarity movement in a peaceful manner which contributed to the great and largely peaceful political/cultural revolution in Eastern Europe during 1989 and the early 90’s. We could say that he lived what he taught. Karol Wojtyła, in his role as John Paul II, developed and participated in the enculturation of principles of culture both theoretically and practically. I believe it will take a number of years to properly classify the discoveries of the scaffolding and school of thought of Karol Wojtyła in relation to philosophy in general, especially in a way that bridges and communicates the many traditions in which he worked. ‘Principles’ serves well in the meantime. It both illustrates this scaffolding and leaves it open to revision and specification.

2.1 THE MEANING OF HUMAN EXPERIENCE

The first principle, in the constitution of culture as idea and thing, is the important work he has done on the reconciliation of the meaning of experience in traditional and modern philosophy as we find throughout his philosophical works but especially his major philosophical work and the surrounding and supporting articles already mentioned. That work concerns ‘distinguishing’ and then ‘clarifying’ the cognitive organizational unity as well as the organic ontic unity of the meaning of human experience in its subjective and objective dimensions. This ‘distinguishing’ was key to indicate the point of departure in the modern understanding of the meaning of human experience from that of the classical. This ‘distinguishing’ illuminates an oversight of the presence of ‘I’ in its ontic, objective reality in numerous modern considerations of the subjectivity of the person and consciousness

⁶ Ten years after the visit of John Paul II to Chile the cardinal recalled the words given by the Pope at the mass in Parque O’Higgins which had and still have a lasting impression in Chile: “¡El amor es más fuerte!”



where subjective idealist foundations are accepted not only in relation to certain cognitive processes but also in relation to the objective being of the person in the cosmos. The ‘clarifying’ shows this oversight in the identification of various kinds of subjective cognitive activity which rely on the underlying objective *suppositum* the human person ontically as well as phenomenologically in so far as their operation is concerned. For example, we see this in his considerations on the place of self-knowledge in the cognitive and ontic structure of the human person.⁷ The proper identification of ‘self-knowledge’⁸ offers us a solution to an often repeated tendency to fall into circular reasoning in the philosophies of consciousness with a subsequent proclivity for skepticism and agnosticism.

Through a similar analysis⁹ of the cognitive and ontic structure of ‘moral experience’ we see Wojtyła attempt to break the subjectivization of morality in the science of ethics. These two kinds of experience namely, “self-knowledge” and “moral experience” play particularly important roles in the constitution of culture both as idea and thing. On the basis of his philosophical analysis of experience and the various kinds of experience his pastoral comments, speeches, encyclicals and addresses regarding the importance of overcoming the tendency toward philosophical and ethical relativism are more poignant and contextual. His pastoral comments take on a philosophical, scientific character in addition to their pastoral character. While we do not hear much about this foundational work in the article on the constitution of culture we must understand that his attempts to do an objective analysis of the idea of culture are justified on the background of his work to illuminate the objectivity of the *suppositum*, the human person, in the meaning of human experience and the ensuing validation of objectivity in “self-knowledge” and “moral experience”. We must understand that these considerations are always the backdrop of his work and enter both formally and materially into any given investigation. These insights (formally) are also responsible for the components (materially) of the scaffolding and focus of a Wojtylian essay.¹⁰

⁷ Wojtyła (1976) p. 222, says “This state of research on the human being, and in particular its rather well-defined and differentiated approach to the basic source of knowledge of the human being, that is, to the full and multidimensional experience of the human being, allows us to accept completely the ancient concept of *suppositum* and, at the same time, to understand it (in) a new way. To say that the human being - I and every other human being - is given in experience as a *suppositum* is to say that the whole experience of the human being, which reveals the human being to us as someone who exists and acts, both allows and legitimately requires us to conceive the human being as the subject of that existence and activity. And this is precisely what is contained in the concept of *suppositum*. This concept serves to express the subjectivity of the human being in the metaphysical sense. By “metaphysical,” I mean not so much “beyond-the-phenomenal” as “through-the-phenomenal,” or “trans-phenomenal.”

⁸ Wojtyła (1969 AP), p. 35, says self-knowledge, “consists in the understanding of one’s own self and is concerned with a kind of cognitive insight into the object that I am for myself.”; see also Buttiglione (1997), pp. 180–181.

⁹ Karol Wojtyła (1955-1957), pp. 111-135. And Wojtyła (1955-1957a), pp. 113-140. Wojtyła (1969), pp. 5-24. (See also Wojtyła (1993) pp. 107-127). Wojtyła (1988), pp. 21-28. (Cf. Wojtyła 1978).

¹⁰ On the formal and material objects of an investigation, cf. Wojtyła (1965) p. 281.

2.2 THE HUMAN PERSON: THE AXIOLOGICAL CAUSE AND THE PRAXEOLOGICAL CAUSE OF HUMAN CULTURE

The human person exists as the ontic cause of human culture (John Paul II, 1980). In order for there to be a human culture there must be human persons (Wojtyła, 1976, p. 255). This is the next principle in the constitution of culture. The analysis of the person as the ontic cause of human culture takes place by means of the analysis of *praxis* analyzed and understood with regards to the “priority of the person” in both the metaphysical (or axiological) and praxeological aspects of this priority.¹¹ The priority in the metaphysical sense refers to the *suppositum* of the human person as the subject of activity. The human being is the font and subject of all human *praxis*. There is a certain metaphysical priority to the human being when considering the nature of human *praxis*. It also stands to reason, that there cannot be an ‘ontic-causal’ relationship of the human person to human culture without a praxeological link. Humans do not by their mere existence “cause” culture.

The ontic-causal relationship of the person to human culture must be understood through a phenomenological analysis of the metaphysics of the person and not merely through an abstraction. In place of abstraction Wojtyła makes use of induction. The induction Wojtyła makes use of is not that of Mill and the positivists but rather that of Aristotle working from the particular to the general.¹² It is necessary that this metaphysics of the person be established phenomenologically in order to maintain the development of Wojtyła’s realist, objective discoveries regarding the meaning of human experience and the analysis of that experience, beginning in the universal, objective experience of being a person. A metaphysics of the person based on an abstraction while perhaps complimentary does not develop along the lines necessary for the dialogue with the philosophies of consciousness which seek to base the constitution of the person and culture in reliable human experience. It was for example, through the recognition of the subjective experience of the objectivity of the self that he created a sound philosophical ground work to overcome the subjectivization of values and truth. These insights have profound ramifications for our consideration of culture as idea and thing. We are all persons and participate as objective, ontic-causes in the creation of culture. The experience we have as the axiological cause of

¹¹ Wojtyła (1977) p. 266, says “The priority of the human being as the subject of activity has fundamental significance for the constitution of culture (...)”; and in p. 267 says: “The priority of the human being in the metaphysical sense means that *praxis* presupposes the human being as its subject, and not vice versa. The priority of the human being in the praxeological sense requires us to reduce the very essence of *praxis* to the human being: the essence of *praxis* consists in realizing ourselves and, at the same time, in making the nonhuman reality outside ourselves more human. Only *praxis* understood in this sense provides a basis for speaking of culture as a connatural reality in relation to the human being.”

¹² Wojtyła (1969) p. 121, says: “Induction (...) does not have the meaning ascribed to it by Mill and the positivists, but the meaning ascribed to it by Aristotle: it is not a method of generalizing a certain thesis, but simply a method of directly grasping a general truth in particular facts.”



human culture is universal, undeniable and provides a basis for the consideration of the relevance of the phenomenological to universal human experience.

In addition to the universal experience of our axiological, ontic-causal relationship to human culture as human persons we also have the aforementioned universal experience as participators, praxeologically in the cause of culture. This universal experience is open to its own phenomenological analysis considering the various dimensions of this experience which though particular to the individual possesses certain universal dimensions. From our particular experiences, grounded in certain universal dimensions of our experience, we can discuss various aspects of culture with renewed hope of arriving at objective considerations.

Praxis must be analyzed along the lines of the phenomena of human action which constitute culture. Human action as distinguished from human existence exists in a kind of “praxeological-causal” relationship to human culture. The ontic-causal dependency of human culture on the human person and human action is a metaphysically derived but phenomenologically accessible - ontic-causal relationship. This is in keeping with the development of his thought in the problem of the constitution of human culture through human *praxis* provided *praxis* is understood to have an ontic dependency on the *suppositum* the human person.

In the same way that the constitution of the self includes the reciprocal relationship between the ontological fact of the person as the *suppositum* and the praxeological fact of the person constituting and creating themselves so too, the constitution of human culture depends on a similar reciprocal relationship between the ontic-causality of the person to human culture and the actual constitution of culture through human action.

3. THE TRANSITIVE AND INTRANSITIVE DIMENSIONS OF PRAXIS IN THE CONSTITUTION OF CULTURE

There are two dimensions of *praxis* which can be considered as principles in the constitution of culture. They are the transitive and the intransitive (Wojtyła, 1977) and (John Paul II, 1981, Part II). The metaphysical ontic *suppositum* of the *humanum* manifests itself as the ontic-cause of human culture while the praxeological cause manifests in *self-fulfillment*¹³ along lines which are at one and the same time

¹³ ‘Self-fulfillment’ in Wojtyła has three basic meanings. 1. The realization of some action proper to human persons. 2. The satisfaction achieved at the realization of some action. 3. The perfection of the person achieved in the realization of an action. The second sense is considered influential in the constitution of culture when ascertaining the true good and perfection of persons as opposed to something which is misleading or which comprises a false good or an apparent good. The tension created in the proper discernment of the true good is an essential aspect of the battle over the proper ideas in the constitution of culture.

transitive and intransitive.¹⁴ Basing his thought on several Thomistic texts¹⁵ Wojtyła tells us that “Culture is basically oriented not so much toward the creation of human products as toward the creation of the human self, which then radiates out into the world of products.” (Wojtyła, 1977, p. 265).

Our actions are transitive in so far as they extend beyond us and affect the outside world. They are intransitive¹⁶ in so far as they remain in us as subjects and determine our inner quality, structure and makeup as persons. For example, through our work, a dimension of *praxis*, we provide for our needs as well as legitimate wants. Through our work we enculturate and establish meaning in culture. What follows from this is that it is not so much the outward effect which constitutes culture but rather the way in which both the outward and the inward make our world more human. Over time, work in its transitive dimension abandons man through irrelevance or turns on him through destructive forces which are unleashed when the person is lost as the center of focus. The intransitive aspect does not abandon us over time. It does not become irrelevant. It does not turn on us, as the transitive aspects of our works seem to do. We must recognize that there is a relationship between the idea of the end and the characteristics of human action, which arise out of the idea of the end. The end, which we have in mind, shapes the path we take to get there. Those things, which we value, and those things, which we do not value as related to that end, define our values. The immediate ‘ends’ we set also define the kind of culture we create. We must ask ourselves the important questions regarding the relationship between transitive and intransitive ends. This is the fuller sense of the priority of the person when considering human culture. It is the fact that the human person is simultaneously the true subject and *telos* of culture which makes up this priority. It is the recognition of the universal, phenomenologically verifiable nature of this reality and relationship which makes the work of Wojtyła so relevant for the consideration of the problem of the constitution of culture as idea and thing.

In line with the traditional ethics of Aristotle, Augustine and Aquinas, for whom the value of human action is determined not only by the end but also through the means, Wojtyła draws our focus away from the tendency to constitute the idea of

¹⁴ Wojtyła (1977) pp. 265-266, says “As I understand St. Thomas’ thought, human activity is simultaneously *transitive* and *intransitive*.”

¹⁵ Wojtyła (1977) p. 273. He cites Aquinas, *Summa Theologica* I, 23, 2 ad 1; I, 56, 1; I, 18, 3 ad 1; I, 85, 2; I-II, 31, 5; and I-II, 1, 6 ad 1.

¹⁶ Wojtyła (1977), p. 267, says: “Human beings (...) may not be deprived of their auto teleology; they may not be regarded as a means or tools in their own praxis, but must preserve their own proper superiority in relation to it, their priority in the praxeological sense. This superiority is synonymous with regarding the intransitive in human activity as more important than the transitive. In other words, that which conditions the value of human beings and comprises the essentially human quality of their activity is more important than that which is objectified in some product or other and serves to “transform the world” or merely exploit it.”



culture for particular pragmatic ends, as is the case in the idea of culture presented by Marxism, consumerism, post-metaphysical and pragmatic models of culture, to the means through which we constitute our idea of culture.

In addition, Wojtyła goes beyond the consideration of the proper constitution of the idea of culture in the individual subject; combining this notion with the proper understanding of the actual constitution of culture in the world. This illuminates our need to understand the role of the doctrine of exemplariness in his thought. Wojtyła places the being of the human person in the world or in the cosmos (Wojtyła, 1969, p. 76). He does not consider the human person merely along the lines of subjective constitution. This is important because the doctrine of exemplariness is the basis for the justification of any criticisms brought forth regarding proper ideas in relation to human culture in the real world. The axiological priority of the person in the constitution of culture, in so far as its value to illuminate valuable critique regarding aspects of that which is found in culture, would to some extent be absent of any real content without the role of the doctrine of exemplariness. Without the doctrine of exemplariness we may certainly affirm the ontic-causal relationship between the human being and human culture but ‘human culture’ would be devoid of content without a means by which to evaluate that which belongs to the *humanum* and that which does not.

Praxis is a testimony of the necessity of death and our struggle against it. That struggle highlights the importance of the relation between culture and work, culture and *praxis*.¹⁷ It highlights the need for the proper differentiation, coordination and expression of human meaning in culture throughout our earthly work. It reminds us of the need for ordering these aspects properly. The struggle with death, which finds expressions in our works, is a reminder of the need for differentiation and coordination with regards to the transitive and intransitive. In the struggle against death there is an expression of the metaphysical meaning of the person. There is an intransitive aspect the meaning of which must be preserved and ordered throughout life lest the intransitive value and purpose of our struggle with death be lost in the struggle to have and to possess that which in the end cannot be had nor possessed. The transitive end of our *praxis* in general and with regards to human culture refers to the immediate *telos* of the action. The impressing of meaning on our products and the enculturation of our world with culture, marked with a sign of our struggle against death is an indication of the intransitive dimension of human *praxis*. This intransitive dimension has another *telos* than that of the transitive. Per Wojtyła, this *telos* is one which is connatural to the final end of man, one which reflects, mortality, the hope of eternity and resurrection (Wojtyła, 1977, pp. 271 and 273).

¹⁷ Wojtyła (1977) p. 275, n. 18, says: “Culture is a cipher pointing to the Transcendent”.

It is through the proper consideration of the intransitive meaning of human action and human culture that we see converge key elements in Wojtyła's philosophy of the human person such as, placing conscience in its practical role in the intellect,¹⁸ the religious knowledge of the person in the search for meaning (John Paul II, 1993, p. 98) and the transcendence of the person in action. While there is a mode of behavior appropriate for the realization of any given transitive effect there is also a mode of behavior which must accompany that action to insure that it is leading the person to that human fulfillment specific to the intransitive and even moral fulfillment of the person. It is the conscience that reveals this specific mode of truth, that is the intransitive. Technical know-how can reveal to the person the mode of truth regarding the fulfillment of the desired transitive effects of action but an altogether different thing is needed to reveal to us the mode of truth regarding the fulfillment of the intransitive (Wojtyła, 1969 AP, p. 154). The intransitive fulfillment of the person is dependent on this relationship between truth and freedom which is illuminated by the conscience in its role of practical judgement. The fulfillment of the person in action, involving self-possession,¹⁹ is therefore, indicative of that transcendence of the person in action.

The discovery of the 'religious sense' or 'religious knowledge'²⁰ of the person seems to provide us with a philosophical basis for the inclusion of transcendent meaning in our idea of human culture. While it does not justify, on a philosophical basis, such concepts of faith as those found in a particular claim of revelation, the place of faith as an expression of the transcendent and intransitive meaning of human action finds fertile ground in which to manifest as an aspect of the culture of a people. Philosophy is key as a mediator of the 'religious sense' and actual religious expressions. For Wojtyła, philosophy plays a role in the creation, formation, and preservation of human culture when it is reflective of the intransitive, metaphysical aspects of the human person. It cannot do that

¹⁸ Wojtyła (1965), p. 281 says "The directly practical role in human knowledge is performed actually by conscience and habitually by the proficiency called prudence."

¹⁹ In Wojtyła (1969 AP), p. 103 ff. we see that "self-governance" also called "self-possession" is a unique quality of persons and does not exist among the animals. This is partly why we do not refer to animals as persons. Persons by their very structure possess themselves and exercise this self-possession in a number of self-determining ways. We must consider self-governance prior to such things as self-determination and self-control. These later are the result of self-governance and self-possession. Self-governance cannot be reduced to any given individual act of the will such as those seen in an act of self-control. We are speaking of the fact of man's structure as one who is "in possession" of himself. Self-control only enters the picture later, so to speak, when we speak of particular acts of the will which seek to limit man from excess. The person nonetheless already exhibits self-governance in his structure as one who can determine himself.

²⁰ On the basis of the spiritual *suppositum* of the human person such a concept would include contemplation of the Transcendentals, appreciation of and a place for worship in culture and freedom bounded by truth.



if it loses its sapiential dimension and is satisfied with mundane or merely formalistic, linguistic exercises.²¹

CONCLUSION

At the outset of this short synopsis of our investigation, we saw how Wojtyła identified a tension between the subjective and objective interpretation of the meaning of human experience. After identifying the locus of the apparent contradiction his distinctions and clarifications brought us new categories of experience through which to dispel the apparent contradiction and open a path to discoveries of universal objectivity. Similarly, we see here that he identifies a tension and apparent contradiction between the meaning of the horizontal and vertical transcendence of the person in action, between the horizontal transcendence of human culture and the vertical transcendence of human culture. We may also express this as an apparent tension between the transient and intransient end and meaning of human action and human culture. The concepts of human culture we are offered for example in the materialist concept or the consumerist concept seem incapable of integration in this regard. They do not offer suggestions for integration based on the principles of the proper constitution of human culture along axiological and praxeological considerations of the human person in action; the human person who is the subject and object of human culture, the human person considered as a being with a transcendent end beyond the present world. For Wojtyła this tension is solved when considering what has been said up till now is used as a lens to consider the fuller meaning of the transcendence of the person in action in both its transitive and intransitive aspects in both the horizontal and vertical aspects of transcendence.²²

In establishing the ontic-causal relationship of the human person to human culture in such a fashion as to invoke our understanding of this relation as contain-

²¹ John Paul II (1998) secs. 81, 83 writes “(...) philosophy needs first of all to recover its *sapiential dimension* as a search for the ultimate and overarching meaning of life”. He also writes: “(...) the need for a philosophy of *genuinely metaphysical* range, capable, that is, of transcending empirical data in order to attain something absolute, ultimate and foundational in its search for truth. This requirement is implicit in sapiential and analytical knowledge alike; and in particular it is a requirement for knowing the moral good, which has its ultimate foundation in the Supreme Good, God himself. Here I do not mean to speak of metaphysics in the sense of a specific school or a particular historical current of thought. I want only to state that reality and truth do transcend the factual and the empirical, and to vindicate the human being’s capacity to know this transcendent and metaphysical dimension in a way that is true and certain, albeit imperfect and analogical. In this sense, metaphysics should not be seen as an alternative to anthropology, since it is metaphysics which makes it possible to ground the concept of personal dignity in virtue of their spiritual nature. In a special way, the person constitutes a privileged locus for the encounter with being, and hence with metaphysical enquiry”. Here, we see Wojtyła’s ideas on human culture diverge most sharply from those ideas of human culture which remain limited or reduced to that which is purely transitive and mundane.

²² For more on the different kinds of transcendence found in Wojtyła, see Seifert (1981), p. 130.

ing both axiological and praxeological dimensions I think it is reasonable to suggest a distinction implicitly contained within Wojtyła's notion of the 'ontic-causal' dependency of human culture on the human person. This ontic-causal dependency should be considered in two aspects correlating to the axiological and praxeological. I mean, we must distinguish not two things but two aspects of this thing the human person in relation to human culture, namely, the being of the person and the action of the person.

As the ontic-cause of human culture the idea of human culture we possess must include an idea of the person which adequately accounts for the subjective and objective in human experience. We must become capable of rendering an integrated understanding of the meaning of human experience in general and in regards to human culture. To do this our understanding of human experience must exhibit an ontic unity as well as a constitutive unity. It must also include in some sense the vertical transcendence of the person in action in relation to culture. Only with the inclusion of the concept of the vertical transcendence of the person in action can human culture be constituted along lines which are accurate and faithful to the fuller meaning of 'human person'. Our analysis and the experience of human history in relation to the meaning of culture attest to this simultaneously.

This brief consideration of the problem of the constitution of culture in the thought of Karol Wojtyła is merely an introduction to the topic. It is meant to suggest some direction to the reading of the philosophical analysis and methodology of Karol Wojtyła which may be applied to a number of areas. It also suggests Wojtylian inspired insights pointing to the possibility of a more integrated relationship between the discoveries of the philosophies of being and the philosophies of consciousness with regards to philosophy in general and specifically to the problem of the idea of culture.

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