Pragmatic politeness and history of ideas: face and freedom

Abstract

Brown and Levinson’s Theory of Politeness (1978, 1987) has been criticized for its concept of negative face, a notion related to the idea of negative cult (Durkheim, 1982 [1912]) and to the idea of territory (Goffman, 1972 [1967]). The concept of freedom – freedom of action and freedom from imposition – however, which is actually a part of the definition of the theory, has so far not been taken into account by its critics. This idea of freedom is peculiar to Anglo-Saxon culture, and corresponds to the notion of negative liberty espoused by the historian of ideas Isaiah Berlin (2004). Later theories of politeness –those of Watts (2003), for example– are not based on a concept of freedom, but rather on a peculiarity of Brown and Levinson’s theory that explains some of the criticism it has received.